Blackness as Specter: How Racialization Mediates Dominican and Panamanian Black Social Movement Outcomes

Both Panama and the Dominican Republic have a more than 500-year relationship with the afro descendant people within each nation, yet today demonstrate vastly different political responses to black contention.[1] In Panamá, black contention across several generations has achieved incremental positive state outcomes.[2] such as recognition of African identity and efforts to address discriminatory practices affecting afro-descendant people (Barrow, 2012; Barrow & Priestly, 2003; Priestly & Barrow, 2008). Whereas in the Dominican Republic, black contention has met with regressive state responses that restrict afro-descendants' prospects for future positive political participation and outcomes.[3]

On the surface, it would appear as if black contention in Panama has engendered more of its desired outcomes than black contention in the Dominican Republic. What accounts for these differences, given that both countries demonstrate comparable histories as former Spanish colonies, have a significant, multi-generational presence of afro-descendant people, and boast active, organized black contention today?[4] Are there key variables that enable a fuller understanding of the processes and factors contributing to the variation in black movement outcomes for each country?

This paper argues that there are key variables that can better explain black movement

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1 The term black contention incorporates the concepts of black identity and social movement contention, described further below.

2 The study of social movement outcomes is a growing field that dates back to William Gamson's (1990) typology of outcomes. Analytical use of the concept in this paper is described further below. For a more current exploration of outcomes research see: Bosi, Lorenzo and Katrin Uba. 2009. "Introduction: The Outcomes of Social Movements." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 14(4):409–15, and see Amenta, Edwin, Neal Caren, Elizabeth Chiarello, and Yang Su. 2010. "The Political Consequences of Social Movements." *Annual Review of Sociology* 36(1):287–307.

3 As will be discussed later, the Dominican Republic recently revised its immigration policies specifically with respect to Haitians, creating a set of retroactive laws that remove citizenship from children of Haitian parents previously born in the Dominican Republic (dating back to 1929) and denies future citizenship for children of Haitian descent born in the Dominican Republic.

4 See Dawn Duke's "From 'Yélida' to Movimiento de Mujeres Dominico-Haitianas: Gendering Resistance to Whiteness in the Dominican Republic." Pp. 61–92 in *At Home and Abroad: Historicizing Twentieth-Century Whiteness in Literature and Performance*. Knoxville, TN: U of Tennessee P., as well as "Black Movement Militancy in Panamá: SAMAAP's Reliance on an Identity of West Indianness." *Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies* 5(1):75–83 (2010), as well as Jean Muteba Rahier's *Black Social Movements in Latin America : From Monocultural Mestizaje to Multiculturalism*. 1st ed.. New York: Palgrave Macmillan (2012) for an exploration of black social movement histories and strategies in Latin America.

outcomes differences between Panama and the Dominican Republic. Using paired comparative-historical analysis of two mostly similar cases, this study explores structural and cultural variables that help more fully explain why two countries with comparable histories, populations, and governance systems demonstrate different outcomes for black social movements.

The paper is divided into four parts. The first part discusses the theoretical and methodological approaches applied, outlines limitations, provides a set of hypotheses, and defines key concepts used throughout the paper. Next I provide a brief review of notable similarities in historical factors and processes, from colonization to present-day, between the two countries. The third part explores the key difference between the two countries; their relationship to blackness[5] and how this developed from unique historical factors and processes vis-à-vis national identity within each nation-state. In the next part, I test the set of hypotheses, showing how each country's unique relationship to blackness mediates different responses. I conclude with a set of findings and recommendations for further research.

Theory, Analysis and Concepts

Structure, Culture & Racialized Others Matter

Traditional social movement perspectives would compare structural factors in each country in determining, for example, if political opportunities for social movement mobilization and contention exists (Tarrow, 2011). Current-day news articles and social media accounts of Panamanian and Dominican Republic movement activities today could reveal that opportunities to both organize and

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5 The concept of blackness is a key term in this paper that is defined further below in the first section.

implement contention exist in each country, while also revealing that political threats in the Dominican Republic that strip citizen rights from a targeted group of people may negatively affect movements' abilities to succeed.

While useful in helping to bring to the fore potential structural differences that may play a role in the variation seen in black contentious outcomes between the two countries, this type of analysis omits other influencing factors and processes, such as the historical process of building a national identity. Social movement research that uses cultural approaches would certainly explore the contestation between social movement and State actors behind the meaning-making project that established national identity.

Both approaches have strengths that enable analysis to ...(continue here with additional literature review of structural, cultural approaches).

Combining structural and cultural approaches, then, has the potential to present a stronger analytic framework through which one can explore the variations in black contention outcomes in these two countries. Two promising efforts in this direction are Fligstein and McAdam's strategic action field, which combines structural and cultural movement analysis with a focus on the fields in which movement actors operate (2012) and James Jasper's strategic interaction perspective, which focuses on movement actors' interactions with the arenas in which they operate (2015). (Add more on how and why these two approaches are applied.)

(In discussing outcomes research, review and revise text below)

Social movement outcomes research has emerged over the last 20-25 years from a need to determine what, if any, measurable or identifiable outcomes can be attributed to social movements. Amenta et al (2010) highlight how movement outcomes theory has focused on movement elements

without adequately accounting for the dynamic, socio-historical contingencies of each movement's trajectory within each's own country. For the purposes of this paper, movement outcomes are perceived as substantive to a movement's goals (and not to a nation-state's goals) when some form of legitimate governance (be it legislative, judicial, or executive) structure, process, or policy shift takes place that can be causally linked to a movement's goals. The movement's historical location within a given country's socio-cultural-political trajectory is deemed relevant to determining what constitutes success in terms of movement goals and outcomes. Such consideration in analyzing movement outcomes brings both cultural politics and political process theories into alignment in order to construct a fuller picture of the relevant factors affecting movement outcomes along political, social, and cultural lines.

(Discuss national identity formation as key to nation-building project) *incorporate & revise old text:* Concepts of belonging, via national identity-formation, provide the foundational (both the initial and subsequently revised) platform from and through which a given geographic area comes to understand and perceive itself as a nation (Anderson, 2006). Such a process inevitably constructs a national identity that is imagined, intricately tied to state building projects such as citizenship, personal rights, and claims to resources, which become codified and normalized in formal and informal socio political and cultural processes within a given nation-state.[6]

Relying on Anderson's[7] social historical approach, I explore how state building processes in the

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6 Analysis of the nation building process as an imagined space to which a group of people belong uses Benedict Anderson's theoretical exploration of the constructed nation in his 2006 edition of his seminal work *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Rev. ed.. London ; New York. Key points used here include the role the state plays in imagining the people of the nation and how social, economic, and political systems reinforce this imagining into a sufficiently coherent concept that evolves into nation-ness.

7 Nationalism in this research study is to be conceptually understand in the same manner utilized by Anderson, not in the contemporary understanding of insularity and xenophobia, but rather as a social construction coming into existence after the Enlightenment period in which nations take on distinct geographic boundaries and cultural-lingual, socio-political norms generally representative of the people inhabiting their given geographies, i.e. nation-states(as we understand them today).

Dominican Republic and Panama contributed to the nation-state's understanding of its identity relative to the concept of blackness, or black otherness. Of course, this means that the process of state imagining has to be inexorably understood as a racialized process (Omi and Winant, 1994),[8] a critical element often ignored in political analysis and nation-state formation theories throughout the 20th century.

(Provide literature usage of racial formation theories and (racialized) nation-building.)

(**From deleted footnote**: *For extensive discussions and exploration of this phenomenon in Dominican national identity, this research relies on the work of Kimberly Eison Simmons's Reconstructing Racial Identity and the African Past in the Dominican Republic. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida (2009); Ernesto Sagás (2001); David Howard (2001); Silvio Torres-Saillant (1998); and LaToya A. Tavernier (2008).*)

Two Countries, Two Histories Compared

Historical comparison of the Panama and the Dominican Republic is used to account for the development of ideas and concepts related to national identity and politics as they have changed over time. Such a perspective views institutional practices becoming codified and normative not as disconnected iterations from isolated events, free of the socio-historical contexts that give rise to their occurrence. Rather, any governance implementation, be it from reaction to general public challenges, party negotiations, revolutions, or other social phenomena, is understood as a contingent articulation arising from its own particular socio-cultural-political milieu. Such articulations become normalized through social and institutional practices, such that over time governance processes and policies appear normative, necessary, and essential to its particular nation-state.[9]

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8 Omi and Winant provide a critique of nation-formation theories that fail to account for identity-building and its racial articulations in designating belonging to the nation, establishing how the state building processes that identify and codify who belongs and who doesn't belong racializes the nation.

9 This perspective is theoretically based on Michel Foucault's analysis of institutionalization of practices over time by the state. See Michel Foucault and Anthony M. Nazzaro. 1972. "History, Discourse and Discontinuity." *Salmagundi* (20):225–48, as well as *The*

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In the two selected cases, each nation-state's relationship to the concept of blackness highlights key analysis that cannot be achieved through use of contemporary, normative definitions of what blackness means. Analysis has to take into account how each nation-state has understood and related to the concept of blackness over time, requiring an understanding of the socio-political historical articulations within each nation-state, and how these changed over time in relation to the nation building project. (Discuss why these two cases make the most sense when compared to, say Cuba, or Brazil.)

As such, historical comparison of the two cases better enables analysis to explore the following key questions: what are the historical, social and political differences evidenced in how each country's perception of blackness vis-à-vis the state articulates state responses to identity-based challengers from below? Are the challenges that black social movement organizations have faced in their respective countries different, and if so, what are the potential effects of these differences? What are the historical developments in each country's society that helps shape the general public's relationship to the concept of blackness and its understanding of the concept vis-à-vis national identity?

Racial formation theories from anthropology and cultural sociology, political participation theories from political science and political sociology, and social movement and outcomes theories from political science and political sociology are synthesized to create a state formation theoretical framework that connects historical national identity development with racialized politics and its subsequent institutionalization within governance practices and policies. Analysis focuses on how different processes in Dominican and Panamanian histories affected national identity formation and how this process influenced the articulation of the concept of blackness vis-à-vis national identity.

Archaeology of Knowledge. New York: Harper & Row (1976).

Specifically, the paper explores each nation's relationship to racialized otherness, specifically black people by: comparing the socio-political historical processes that informed each country's national identity building project relative to blackness; and determining what different processes and factors in each country contributed to different political landscapes in which black movements operated.

Analysis relies on a combination of secondary and primary data. Primary data includes published and public texts created by social movement and state actors, which includes reports, blogs, opinion articles, and legislation. Secondary data relies on historical literature and other previous analysis that traces each country's nation-building processes and key events. The data used is by no means exhaustive, as it relies on readily available data found online and in the Latin American Library holdings at Tulane University. The lack of primary and secondary texts originating in each country that are not available digitally or locally, does limit the potential robustness of the data. This limitation also points to the limited scope of this analysis, which attempts to highlight an issue requiring further attention and research. Additionally, because this research is limited to two countries as an initial test that relies on key commonalities between Panama and Dominican Republic, it does exclude other Latin American countries with significant afro-descendant populations, such as Cuba, Brazil, Venezuela, Columbia, and Honduras, which may also further enhance analysis.

Hypotheses

In exploring both nation-states' relationships with their afro-descendent histories and people, this paper asserts that blackness is a key concept in the national identity building project that mediates how each nation-state responds to black movement contention. As such, the following hypotheses are presented:

H1: Shared geography, proximity, and history with an independent black nation limits opportunities for positive black movement outcomes in the Dominican Republic.

H2: Absence of shared geography, proximity, and history with an independent black nation contributes to opportunities for positive black movement outcomes in the Panama.

H3: Strong State articulation and institutionalization of national identity as specifically non-black limits opportunities for positive black movement outcomes in the Dominican Republic and Panama.

H4: Presence of indigenous population contributes to opportunities for positive black movement outcomes in Panama.

H5: Absence of indigenous population limits opportunities for positive black movement outcomes in the Dominican Republic.

Key Concepts (maybe bring this to the top of this section)

Define racialization, the racialized other, blackness and the black other

Define political participation, national identity, (racialized) nation-state (the State),

(on political participation: review and revise:) Traditional political participation perceives voting and party-related activities as normative, legitimate, conventional political activities, and perceives civic activities outside of conventional politics such as protest as unconventional political activities. Such demarcations have been blurred considerably over the last twenty years, with recent theory including protest as normative political participation. Joakim Ekman and Erik Amnå (2012)

offer a thorough analysis of the conceptual evolution of political participation as a concept and build

on this evolution in order to establish that political participation has five dimensions; electoral,

consumer, party, protest, and contact, and that across each of these dimensions, participation can be

individual or collective and latent or manifest. Following this conceptualization, political participation,

as it is used in this research, includes all activities with the potential to influence socio-political

governance programs, policies, and structures.

Comparable Trajectories

(Provide brief overview of colonization trajectories, African slavery history and early afro-
descendent contention and struggle to escape/end slavery, elite struggle for independence, experience
with U.S. occupation and intervention. Review and revise existing text.)

What are the historical events that come to represent how a given country develops into its

current iteration? Is it the wars they fight, the constitutions they design, the institutions they codify, or

the culture they uphold? Of course, each of these plays a role, as do many other social phenomena, in

shaping any given country's socio-cultural-political trajectory through time.

As former Spanish colonies, Panama and the Dominican Republic share broadly similar

historical trajectories with some exceptional differences that will be explored in more detail further

below. Both countries were established in geographies previously inhabited by indigenous, non-Iberian

people; both heavily imported African slaves to provide the labor needed for agricultural and industrial

activities; both sought to secede from Spain and establish independent nations in the early part of the

19th century; both were heavily influenced by an Iberian heritage that each champions to this day; and

both experienced significant U.S. occupation and intervention in state matters in the 19th and early 20th centuries. These generally similar historical occurrences are traced briefly below.

(early black struggle in each country—from slavery to the 19th century century:) From the early days of colonization, black slaves rebelled. (Provide brief overview of Dominican and Panamanian slave rebellions between the 15th and 19th centuries).

(Ruling elite's identity becomes national identity:) The quest to establish an independent Panamanian and Dominican nation, each with its own identity began in earnest in the early 19th Century in tangent with the rash of independence movements that swept Latin America (Materno Vazquez, 1987; Williams, 1984). Similar to other Latin American national projects, the push for freedom was not a popular movement, that is, the working masses did not initiate it. The ruling elite of the time, comprised of Iberian, Catholic, white, creole land owners and industrialists on the isthmus desired and pushed for independence well before the United States entered the arena. Ruling elites who pushed for independence forged a national Panamanian and Dominican identity that emphasized Spanish heritage and Catholic religion. The concept of mestizaje[10] informed national identity-building efforts in both countries, giving rise to the dominant white Iberian catholic identity that may or may not have mixed indigenous heritage (known as *mestizo*).

(The U.S. intervenes:) (Provide brief overview of U.S. intervention in both countries)

Despite similar experiences with African slaves, ruling elite's national identity projects, and U.S. intervention and invasion, the two countries came to understand, articulate, and engage the

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10 For a thorough exploration of how the concept of mestizaje informed national identity formation in Latin America, see Peter Wade's *Race and Ethnicity in Latin America.* For racially based, national identity-related explorations of Panamá see Melva Lowe de Goodin's *Afrodescendientes en el Istmo de Panamá 1501-2012* (2012) and Octavio Tapia's *Para entender al panameño : una aproximación a su identidad cultural* (2009). For a similar treatment of the Dominican Republic, see David Howard's *Coloring the Nation : Race and Ethnicity in the Dominican Republic* (2001) and Ernesto Sagás' *Race and Politics in the Dominican Republic* (2001).

concept of blackness vis-à-vis national identity in interestingly different ways, which this study emphasizes as a sufficient factor contributing to identity-based social movement outcomes.

Dissimilar National Identity Racialization

Blackness as a political identity, both for socio-cultural and socio-political purposes, plays a critical role in understanding the emergence, actions, and outcomes of Dominican and Panamanian black social movements challenging the state and their abilities to achieve goals that yield positive, desired outcomes. As will be shown through historical comparisons of key events in each country's nation-building history vis-à-vis national identity, the manner in which blackness as a concept comes to be understood and articulated by those in control of constructing and advancing the nation-state in each country sets up uniquely different socio-political environments in which black identity-based contention plays out.

Panama's Relationship with Blackness

From the late 19th century, into the 20th century, and continuing today, black Panamanians—whether Colonial or Antillean afro-descendant people (who migrated to Panamá to work on the cross-isthmus railroad and canal from the latter 19th century into the middle of the 20th century),[11] have consistently and openly contested the official national identity building project in their quest to seek recognition as citizens of the country—with some level of success. unlike the Dominican Republic's history, as will be show below, Panama's history reveals a nation-building project that periodically

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11 In Panamá, afro-descendent people have come to be known as either Colonial or Antillean. A Colonial black Panamanian is Catholic, descended from former slaves, and are native Spanish speakers. An Antillean black Panamanian is Protestant, descended from black migrant workers (typically from Barbados, Jamaica, and other Antillean islands), and are native English speakers.

considers, and ultimately concedes challenge to the official national identity building project.

Why is such a project so central to building a nation-state? Conceiving the nation is considered here an act of socio-cultural-political creation arising out of a collective effort to establish sovereignty for a particular group, and as such national identity comes to serve as proxy for who gets to participate in the nation-building project (Anderson, 2006), as well as a powerful communication mechanism that serves to unify the subjects of the nation-state into an ideal whole to which all who live within the sovereign geography belong.

(State how Espinar and his role as a Simon Bolivar General who helped liberate Panama from Spanish rule portended a potential move for independence via a popular movement but was quashed by the ruling elite who saw the opportunity to form a nation according to their interests. Also point out how the independence from Spain, then Columbia is distinctly different than the D.R.'s independence from Haiti.) From the very beginnings of the nation-building project, black leaders emerged to contest official national identity in Panama, providing alternative responses to the official nation-building processes as their initial step towards establishing political inclusion.[12] A history of contention between black social movement actors and those in power over official nation-building institutions would continue to inform a never-ending tension in Panama's developing conceptualization of the nation-state as a democracy.

Between the 1890's and the 1940's, a variety of black labor unions contested Jim Crow-like

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12 The idea of political inclusion relies on theories of political participation, as described earlier. Political inclusion extends beyond participation by emphasizing the opportunity for participation to enable public involvement in defining and addressing public issues. For a more detailed explanation of the differences between participation and inclusion, see Kathryn S. Quick and Martha S. Feldman's "Distinguishing Participation and Inclusion" in the *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 31(3):272–90 (2011), as well as John S. Dryzek's "Political Inclusion and the Dynamics of Democratization" in *The American Political Science Review* 90(3):475 (1996).

wage differences and working conditions,[13] but it wasn't until the brief Arias government's 1941attempts to systematically exclude black identity and inclusion that this sustained history of contention took a step forward.

The late 1930's and early 1940's ushered in a time of identity crisis for the nascent Panamanian nation. The increasing pressures of the United States military, particularly in its expectations of Panamanian involvement in and support of the U.S. military role in WWII, and the influx of foreign nationals interested in Canal Zone activities, combined to instill in the Panamanian ruling elite a renewed sense of apprehension regarding their Panamanian identity. This apprehension saw the risk of a Panamanian nation becoming lost within the transient nature of outside influences, resulting in a flurry of state-sponsored cultural efforts to fully protect Panamanian national identity, such as an official (but historically fictional) national narrative that emerged during this time in which the conquistador Balboa falls in love with the indigenous princess, Anayansi, giving birth to the Panamanian nation (Pizzurno, 2011; Szok's, 2012).

President Arnulfo Arias, who saw black social movement actors as a perfect foil for his effort to strengthen a mestizo-centric national identity, used this anxiety to codify exclusion of black people in Panama (Barrow and Priestley, 2003; Pizzurno, 2011). while creating state-sponsored institutions, such as the Department of Fine Arts, charged with the cultural work of solidifying the nation-state's mestizo identity (Pizzurno, 2011; Szok, 2012; and Tapia, 2009). Arias attempted to legally exclude blackness from the Panamanian identity building project by denying full citizenship and recognition of

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13 See Kofi Boukman Barima's "Caribbean Migrants in Panamá and Cuba, 1851-1927: The Struggles, Opposition and Resistance of Jamaicans of African Ancestry." in *Journal of Pan African Studies* 5(9). (2013) for an account of black Jamaican militancy in Panamá arising out of a trans-national diaspora connection to Marcus Garvy. And see J. A. Zumoff's "Black Caribbean Labor Radicalism in Panamá, 1914–1921" in the *Journal of Social History* 47(2):429–57 (2013) for additional accounts of other Antillean protest in early 20th century Panamá.

black Antilleans.[14]

Leaders such as George Westermann, who was both a national celebrity as a sports figure, as well as a leader in the black social movement, openly contested anti-black legislation promoted by Arias' government. He wasn't alone, however, as already black people (both Colonial and Antillean) had a sustained history of contention against state policies that aimed to relegate afro-descendant people to second-class citizens. Westermann would win his battle to undo Arias' 1941 legislation, achieving a significant victory for black movement-related efforts that would serve as a key foundation to future contention (Barrow and Priestley, 2003; Priestley and Barrow, 2008).

Arias' attempt to exclude black identity from national identity consciousness and official conceptualization based on connecting blackness to foreign-ness ultimately failed, in part because black Colonial leaders (who could not be considered foreign, as they spoke Spanish, were Catholic, and could trace their ancestry to African slaves during the colonial periods from the 16th to the 19th centuries) allied with the targeted Antilleans of Arias' laws to combat what they saw as the legal foundation to deny all black Panamanians full citizenship status.

Similarly, in the months leading up to a 1966 Colón incident (in which the Panamanian government openly and brutally repressed protests in the streets, killing children and adults alike), black students in Colón were increasingly demanding better education, better social services, and better economic opportunities (Arango, 2004). At the same time, while the country was still recovering emotionally and psychologically from a 1964 U.S. military intervention, Marco A. Robles, who served as Panamá's President from 1964 to 1968, was embroiled in the middle of a new peace treaty with the

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14 Largely based on Antillean's non-Panamanian religious and language characteristics, and their status as immigrants, which Arias codified constitutionally in 1941. See Alberto Barrow's *La variable étnica en el marco legal de Panamá*. Panamá: Fuga Ediciones (2012) for analysis of national legislation addressing national identity issues.

United States (Arango, 2004).

This was a volatile time for Panamá, in which U.S. fears of communism spread throughout Latin America. With student protests increasing in Colón, the Robles administration assassinated one of its movement leaders in 1966, a black Antillean who was known to be a communist sympathizer with Cuba. Here, the threat of communism served a similar purpose for the Panamanian government in the same vein as the foreign threat rationale used by Arias in the 1940's. The protests that broke out in Colón in response to the assassination allowed the Panamanian government to label black student protesters in Colón as communist-related and dangerous to the nation (Arango, 2004).

Despite Robles' use of military force, and his subsequent creation of repressive national security laws, black movement leaders found themselves supported by labor leaders, as well as indigenous leaders in their push for progressive changes with regards to social inequalities in Panama. It is critical to note that an already established history of Afro-descendent contention with Panamanian government apparatuses enabled black protesters in Colón not just to quickly mobilize (as they did in the hundreds within 24 hours of the assassination), but to feel sufficiently justified in their actions, recognizing not only their right to protest, but their right to directly challenge national institutions with impunity. Similarly, a history of public action contention from below within Panama, not just from Afro-descendent social movement actors but also from other groups, particularly indigenous and union groups dating back to the early 1900's, created the perception among movement actors that mobilization and public actions (such as marches) were possible in Panama.

Panamanian social movement actors also learned from and communicated directly with the United States Civil Rights Movement and a growing transatlantic diaspora movement that pushed for blackness as a political identity (Duke, 2010; Priestley and Barrow, 2008). Having a history of

contention, as well as some historical evidence of state responsiveness to this contention, black Panamanian movement actors continued to contest and challenge for greater political inclusion from 1966 to modern-day Panama. In the late 1970's, the Catholic Church in Panama initiated a social justice-based pastoral service exclusively aimed at addressing the issues faced by black Panamanians, becoming an important ally. These alliances from indigenous, labor, religious, and international groups contributed to and supported the continuous development of an organized, nation-wide black movement (need explanation about the importance of this factor), which culminated in the 1981 *Congreso del Negro Panameño.*

The 1981 *Congreso del Negro Panameño* was the first of two such *congresos* that took place between the 1980s and 90s, bringing together intellectuals, activists, artists, politicians and other movement actors for the purpose of forging a national union of all Panamanian afro-descendants, regardless of origin. This *congreso* drafted recommendations for constitutional amendments and socio-cultural programs for the Panamanian government to consider.[15] In that same year, la *Sociedad de Amigos del Museo Afro-Antillano de Panamá* formed (Duke, 2010), and in 1989 a small Afro-descendent women-led coup in Portobello ousted a pro-U.S. mestiza mayor form a majority black city (Craft, 2008).

These contentious events throughout Panamanian history between black Panamanians and state actors helped maintain a public, although contentious and uncomfortable, dialogue about blackness as a potential existing characteristic of the Panamanian nation. The government instability between the 1940's and 1980's, the multiple episodes of national contention between black movement actors and

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15 While no academic literature specifically explores this event, the first Congreso developed a publication that provides the full extent of constitutional recommendations generated in 1981. See *Primer Congreso Del Negro Panameño: Nuestra Identidad Es Clave En La Integración Popular*. Panamá: Centro de Convenciones.

state actors, and the continuous push by black movement actors and leaders for national recognition within the very framing of a national Panamanian identity combined to enable Panama to consider blackness as a political identity within the national identity narrative.

Indeed, today one can find a state-sponsored (albeit, poorly underfunded by the government) museum that educates Panamanians about the role of Antillean culture in Panamanian life, a national agency dedicated to the improvement of black life, a *Día del Negro* (an annual afro heritage day that now includes an entire month) and legislation making discrimination on the basis of skin color illegal (but still lacking penal repercussions). However ill-funded, poorly implemented, or symbolic any of these state-supported changes may be, they nevertheless represent socio-political changes at the state level that can be perceived as outcomes resulting from a long history of black identity social movement contention in Panama. The challenges to adequately connecting social movement outcomes notwithstanding (Amenta et al, 2010), historically comparing Panama's relationship to blackness with the Dominican Republic's relationship to blackness will present ....

The Panama's positive responses to black identity-based claims to date, when understood as part of a long, historical process of iterative contention giving rise to ever-expanding state responses, reflect a significant socio-political shift in the national identity project over time. Compared to the Dominican Republic, as will be shown below, Panama's history of black contention paved the way towards the state's developing inclusion of blackness as a sociopolitical identity in the national identity narrative, which cannot be said for black contention in the Dominican Republic.

The Dominican Republic Relationship with Blackness

If Panama's historical trajectory shows a nation-state slowly moving towards inclusion of a

black political identity within its own national identity project, setting the stage for other state-sponsored inclusionary measures, the Dominican Republic's historical trajectory reveals the opposite. The present day Dominican Republic state has a much different relationship with the concept of blackness vis-à-vis national identity, when compared to Panama. Where Panama supports the celebration of black identity as a part of its nation, the Dominican Republic denies it. Where Panama has begun to legislate against discrimination based on blackness, the Dominican Republic has not. And where Panama has a legacy of early colonial black struggle and afro-descendant immigration that paved the way for a continuous history of black identity social movement contention successes (however limited these may be), the Dominican Republic's legacy of early colonial black struggle and afro-descendant immigration did not translate into black contention achieving any positive gains.

To understand these differences, it's important to account for the Dominican Republic's unique difference with not only Panama, but also the rest of Spanish speaking Latin America and the Caribbean, in its path to independence. Unlike other Spanish-speaking Latin American colonies that sought independence from Spain, the Spanish-speaking Dominican half of Hispaniola did not secure its independence as a nation from Spain. Having fallen under Haitian rule from 1822-1844, the Dominican Republic established its independence on February 27, 1844 from Haiti (the newly formed black, French speaking nation on the western half of the island of Hispaniola) by ousting the Haitians during a time of Haitian political instability.

This historical event plays a critical role in any attempt to understanding modern-day Dominican national identity (and the institutionalized state-influenced and supported practices and polices that follow). The Dominican Republic imagined itself, through the eyes of the elites who

founded and governed the country, as a sovereign state opposite its neighbor, Haiti.[16] This opposite-*ness* was (and continues to be) expressly racial in nature. Having the only independent black nation in the Western Hemisphere sharing its border came to serve as one of the most significant factors affecting the Dominican Republic's relationship to blackness vis-à-vis national identity.[17] For example, ruling Spanish speaking elites who attempted to separate the eastern side of Hispaniola from Spain (only to be conquered by Haiti soon thereafter), wrote in their 1805 constitution that Dominicans were the opposite of Haitians, who were all black (Howard, 2001).

Immediately after securing its independence from Haiti, the new nation-state sought external support in its effort to establish stability, pursuing potential annexation by the United States. United States Secretary of State John C. Calhoun is noted as observing in 1844 that annexation served U.S. interests if only to avoid "the further spread of negro influence in the West Indies" (Torres-Saillant, 1998). From the very beginnings of nation-state formation, the nascent country's future economic growth and relationship in the changing global arena depended on its ability to differentiate itself from Haiti. (Note the Panamanian *mestizo* identity doesn't carry the same anti-blackness force, despite it also excluding the possibility of a black identity.)

Prior to the Dominican Republic's Haitian occupation, however, the country's historical

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16 See Cassandro Fortuna's *Haití, el eterno conflicto*. Santo Domingo, RepDom: Editorial Santuario (2012) for an in-depth exploration of the Dominican Republic's complex relationship with Haiti.

17 While this research does not explore in any great detail how the DR relationship with Haiti comes to influence national identity and national conceptualizations of blackness, it is a key idea well studied by culturalists, anthropologists, and historians. See Sheridan Wigginton's "Character or Caricature: Representations of Blackness in Dominican Social Science Textbooks." *Race Ethnicity and Education* 8(2):191–211 (2005) for an analysis of how blackness is represented in textbooks; Silvio Torres-Saillant's "The Tribulations of Blackness: Stages in Dominican Racial Identity." *Latin American Perspectives* 25:126–46 (1998) for a thorough exploration of the historical shaping of DR racialized identity; LaToya A. Tavernier's "The Stigma of Blackness: Anti-Haitianism in the Dominican Republic." *Socialism and Democracy* 22(3):96–104 (2008) for an analysis of the socio-cultural manifestation of DR's national identity vis-à-vis blackness and Haitianess; and Yadira Perez Hazel's "Sensing Difference: Whiteness, National Identity, and Belonging in the Dominican Republic." *Transforming Anthropology* 22(2):78–91 (2014) for an analysis of how the historical trajectory of the DR national identity project continues to influence everyday social life and public relationship to blackness.

trajectory and its relationship with blackness reflected little difference than similar events in Panama. **(Discuss colonial black struggle, black communities, and eventual cooperation between blacks and land owners to secede from Spain prior to Haitian occupation)**

The early Dominican nation experienced a great deal of instability in the years that followed Haitian rule. The years between 1844 (end of Haitian occupation) and 1930 (beginning of Rafael Trujillo dictatorship) brought a host of contested presidencies, dictatorships, and U.S. occupation that would leave their mark well into the present-day. Two periods during this time frame are relevant for a fuller understanding of Dominican relationship to blackness vis-à-vis national identity; 1879 to 1924, which includes ongoing economic and political instability, Ulysses Heureaux's dictatorship, and U.S. military occupation, and 1930 to 1961, the Trujillo dictatorship.

The new nation (founded after ousting the Haitians in 1844) struggled to create a stable economy and government, convinced land owners that a return to Spanish rule would solve their problems. A group of creole and white Dominican land owners, led by Pedro Santana, urged Spain to retake its former colony just seventeen years after it had established independence from Haiti **(citation)**. Political factions who disagreed with the brief Spanish occupation from 1862-1863, particularly land owning dark creoles and formerly freed slaves, waged a war against in the Spanish in the War of Restoration, led by General Luperón and Ulises Heureaux (Derby, 1994).

After the War of Restoration, Luperón and Heureaux fought in ongoing revolutions among different factions attempting to seize control of the country. When Luperón became president in 1879, Heureaux became his most trusted general, later Heureaux gaining power and declaring himself sole authority over the Dominican Republic until his assassination in 1899 (Derby, 1994).

Heureaux's rule was repressive. His assassination at the hand of white and creole landowners

was a result of the national bankruptcy's effects on their production and income, along with fear of invited foreign control via large conglomerates who serviced Heureaux's debts (Derby, 1994).[18] His economic policies and corrupt governance affected ongoing instability for more than twenty years until U.S. occupation in 1916.

(Discuss here black insurgencies during this time and participation of land owning freed slaves in factional wars and unstable governments.)

Because of growing foreign debt, as well as global economic shifts in the sugar market, large conglomerates controlling sugar production dramatically grew between 1907 and 1925 (Betances, 1995). The U.S. occupied the Dominican Republic through most of this period, from 1916 to 1924. During this time, a large influx of Haitians, as well as Antillean laborers were brought to the island to fill a need for cheap labor in the resurging sugar plantations. Also, during this time, border disputes between Dominican and Haitian cattle ranchers in the interior highlands and valleys connecting the two countries intensified because of new U.S. Customs debt collection practices. Tax collection generated a great deal of Dominican cattle rancher resistance, resulting in attacks on the Customs houses and Dominican accusing Haitians of theft as a means of concealing their own illegal cattle activities (Betances, 1995).

The combination of border disputes between Dominican cattle ranchers and Haitians, the influx of newcomer black people to work the cane fields, a desire to appeal to the United States as a white nation in the early 20th century (Torres-Saillant, 1998),[19] and a rising merchant class of mixed heritage

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18 What is interesting about Heureaux is that not only did he control the country for 20 years despite the color of his skin, but that he also managed to become Dominican (and by extension, not black) despite his blackness and Haitian-ness, primarily because he has come to be seen as a key player who wrestled the country back from Spanish control. In coming to be regarded as Dominican, Heureux also comes to be regarded as not being black.

19 Torres-Sailant offers an in-depth exploration of the Dominican Republic's push to erase blackness in its efforts to the become a U.S. territory.

creoles who did not want to associate their mixed heritage with African ancestry, pushed to create the modern Dominican identity, "constructed vis-à-vis Haiti" (Howard, 2001), further solidified during the Trujillo dictatorship, which persists to this day. Unlike similar events in Panama, the time between Heureux's assassination in 1899 and the rise of Trujillo in 1930 was not marked by a history of organized black identity-based political contention **(citation)**.

Instead, consistent insurgencies and revolutions among different power groups, sometimes consisting of white and mulatto elites, other times consisting of mulatto elites and land-holding black people, as well as growing fears (often incited by elites, as in the cattle ranch example above) of a renewed Haitian takeover, contributed to a unique differentiation between Dominicans (even black Dominicans with clear African phenotypical features) and Haitians (who would come to serve as the referent for black identity). As David Howard points out, modern Dominicans "rarely speak of the *nación dominicana*, they are far more likely to mention *raza dominicana*" (2001).

The idea of *raza dominicana*, which exemplifies how modern Dominicans see themselves as non-black people (even when phenotypical features indicate otherwise), can be understood as a socio-cultural phenomenon politically created for the purposes of positioning the nascent Dominican nation-state above its neighbor, the French speaking Haitian nation. The seeds of this national identity took root in the period between Heureaux and Trujillo, a time during which a growing merchant class emerged as the dominating class in Dominican society.

This class, eager to assert itself and maintain dominance in socio-political and economic circles, elevated the concept of *hispanidad*, which emphasized the superiority of being of Iberian descent, white, and Catholic, and which offered a racial democracy in which the only race that mattered was the Dominican race (Torres-Sailant, 1998). In addition, a growing infrastructure,

developed largely by the United States during its eight-year occupation, greatly expanded the ability for previously unconnected hamlets, town, and cities to connect, which in turn enabled the Dominican state apparatus to enter deeper into previously disconnected geographies.

Compared to Panamá in the 1920's, which experienced similar infrastructure expansion during this time, aided in part by the U.S. building of the canal, the Dominican Republic solidified the inner geographical sites and boundaries belonging to the nation-state, enabling the national identity buiding project of *hispanidad* to begin to spread across the Dominican side of Hispaniola, which is evidenced by a demographic shift that occurred between 1899 and 1930. During this time, the Dominican Republic's official demography shifted from majority mulatto to majority *indio*, a term used to describe a mestizo Dominican whose not-quite white skin is reflective of his Iberian and indigenous roots (this despite the fact that the Taino people were decimated to extinction on the island by the end of the the 16th century).

The term *indio* had less of the African ancestral association than the term mulatto implied, which was important for Dominican national identity, which saw itself as a nation-state superior to its neighbor, Haiti. During this shift in national identity formation, the concept of anti-Haitianismo, founded upon the belief that Haitians were in every way inferior people to Dominicans, because they were black, practiced voodoo, and had African ancestry.[20]

Anti-Haitianismo helped begin to solidify Dominican identity while simultaneously establishing Haiti as a pariah nation.[21] The dictator, Rafael Trujillo, would use anti-Haitianismo as one of his many control mechanisms during his more than thirty-year dictatorship, leaving an imprint on

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20 See Tavernier (2008).
21 See ibid.

Dominican society that affects political, social and cultural life in the Dominican Republic today. For example, an analysis of early 21st Century social studies textbooks in the Dominican Republic reveals deliberate state manipulation of skin color, equating blackness to low status and whiteness to high status (in culture, employment, intelligence, etc.).[22]

While the Dominican Republic is not alone in Latin America in championing its Iberian, Spanish-speaking, Catholic heritage, it is the only country to do so vis-à-vis Haiti, a neighboring black country. Trujillo's regime quickly disassembled all vestiges of democracy, and between the 1930s and 1960s, no identity-based black movement was allowed to develop. Not only was Trujillo's regime repressive in all aspects regarding political contention (death squads regularly "disappeared" people who challenged the dictatorship) during the dictator's time in power, but it was also intent on solidifying the future Dominican legacy of *raza dominicana*.[23]

Trujillo solidified the racialization of the Dominican nation, ensuring that blackness would forever be removed from Dominican consciousness in its cultural, social, and political representations and practices.[24] Trained by the U.S. military during the U.S. occupation, Trujillo understood the role a modern infrastructure played in ensuring the state's reach. He continued the public works projects begun by the U.S. military, building roads, schools, and hospitals, and in doing so bringing the imagined nation closer, fast-tracking the complete shift from village isolation and backwardness to connectivity to the larger nation-state network emanating from the capital, Santo Domingo.

Trujillo's regime manipulated racial categorization, connecting blackness with Haitian-ness,

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22 See Sheridan Wigginton's "Character or Caricature: Representations of Blackness in Dominican Social Science Textbooks." *Race Ethnicity and Education* 8(2):191–211 (2005) for a thorough analysis of the Dominican state's use of skin color to promote *hispanidad* and anti-hatianismo in social studies textbooks.
23 See Lauren Hutchinson Derby's *The Dictator's Seduction : Politics and the Popular Imagination in the Era of Trujillo*. Durham: Duke University Press (2009) for an exploration of Trujillo's impact on Dominican society.
24 See Simmons (2009).

crystallizing in the minds of most Dominicans the ideology of Indian-ness, *indio*, they already believed was their heritage. Trujillo used the term *indio* as a color category for identification purposes, and he institutionalized anti-Haitianismo across all state institutions, including education.[25] He used Haitians to connect unruly barbarism, the opposite of an orderly nation, with blackness, and used the specter of Haitian occupation to assure Dominicans that he would protect the nation from the black enemy looming across the Haitian border.[26] If there was any doubt regarding his ability to protect the nation from Haitians, Trujillo demonstrated his capacity to do so in 1937 when he ordered the massacre of thousands of Haitians living on the Dominican side of the border near Dajabón.[27]

While certainly gruesome in the physical destruction of black Haitian bodies, the act was also an intentional symbolic action that signaled to all Dominicans that to be black meant to be Haitian, and to be Haitian meant to be the enemy of the Dominican nation. For the remainder of his dictatorship, Trujillo's regime employed state apparatuses to continue to mold "anti-Haitianismo into a coherent, if weakly based, state ideology. In their discourse, not only did Haitians represent the opposite of everything Dominican; Haiti and Haitian migrants were considered an imminent threat to the nation's survival as a cultural entity."[28]

Trujillo's ideological work would prove powerful, as his very ideas about the *raza dominicana* as compared to Haitians would continue to inform Dominican political practices and policies, as well as social relations, throughout the decades after his dictatorship. He left a legacy of anti-Haitianismo that could be seen through history, and can still be seen today playing out in Dominican-Haitian

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25 See Torres-Sailant (1998) and Tavernier (2008).
26 See Sagás (2000).
27 See Michele Wucker's *Why the Cocks Fight : Dominicans, Haitians, and the Struggle for Hispaniola.* 1st ed.. New York: Hill and Wang (1999) for a detailed exploration of the events leading up to, and during, the Haitian massacre.
28 See Sagás (2000).

relations. Joaquín Balaguer (Trujillo's former right hand man who would later come to serve multiple presidencies after the re-establishment of some semblance of democratic governance) used anti-Haitianismo to cast doubt on the black populist Dr. José Francisco Peña Gómez, who ran for president three times without success between the 1970s and 90s (and is revered today as one of the country's most prominent political figures). Peña Gómez' phenotype features were certainly African, as there can be no doubt that he was a black man, but under the ideologies of *hispanidad* and *raza dominicana*, Peña Gómez was not considered black by average Dominicans because he wasn't Haitian.[29] Also, since Trujillo, anti-Haitianismo to this day "has been used for settling political scores and discrediting Dominican public figures...Black populist leaders and those who have defended the rights of Haitian migrants have been labeled un-Dominican, and their nationalism has been questioned." [30]

Seen from a historical perspective, one can see the role that national identity has played in the Dominican Republic's nation building project. From an Andersonian perspective,[31] the Dominican Republic took the imagined nation to an extreme, creating an ideal type of person one could identify as Dominican, with a distinct exception made for being black and Haitian (which ultimately came to be synonymous), who would be, could be, and historically have been excluded from attaining the full benefits of political participation. This historical summary demonstrates that within this imagined nation the political opportunities for black identity social movement success simply weren't in place. From the Heureaux dictatorship, to the instability of power struggles in the years that followed, prompting U.S. intervention and occupation, and into the subsequent Trujillo dictatorship, the opportunities for contesting the nation on the grounds of black identity failed to materialize in the same

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29 See Fortuna (2012) and Sagás (2000).
30 See Sagás (2000).
31 See Anderson (2006).

manner as they did in Panama.

Testing for Contributing Factors and Processes

(This section has not been touched in over a year and requires substantial revision to align with the hypothesis identified at the top of this paper.)

The Dominican Republic's history also reveals that blackness as a political identity was consistently diminished, undone, and ultimately erased from Dominican social consciousness. It is no wonder that there are no books describing the history of black social movements in the Dominican Republic. There are no academic articles discussing the sustained events of black social movement contention across the Dominican nation-state's history in the same manner as they exist in Panama. For example, by the time black workers on the railroad and canal projects contested their work conditions based on observations of discrimination between black and non-black workers, Panama had already experienced various episodes of contention by black actors seeking to escape slavery between the 16th and 19th centuries.[32]

This existing history of contention in Panamá, along with the large number of black workers immigrating from British colonies in the West Indies who would arrive in Panamá with an existing sense, understanding, and recognition of their blackness, and who would create black towns, such as Portobelo and Colón, contributed to the development of an ever evolving, ever growing black social movement.[33] Such a history of contention on the basis of black identity didn't take place in the

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32 See Jean-Pierre Tardieu's *Cimarrones de Panamá: La Forja de Una Identidad Afroamericana En El Siglo XVI.* Madrid: Iberoamericana (2009) for an in depth discussion of black rebellion in colonial Panamá and the establishment of free black communities.

33 See Trevor O'Reggio's *Between Alienation and Citizenship: The Evolution of Black West Indian Society in Panamá 1914-1964.* Lanham, Md. ; Oxford: University Press of America, Inc. (2006) for a an exploration of how the influx of Antilleans settled into Panamanian society, and Tianna S Paschel and Mark Q. Sawyer's "Contesting Politics as Usual: Black Social Movements,

Dominican Republic, highlighting a key difference between the two countries that illuminates, when taken into each country's historical context, the variation in black social movement outcomes today.

The resulting lacking history of black identity contention alone in the Dominican Republic, however, cannot sufficiently account for social movement outcomes differences with Panamá. At the same time, modern-day factors cannot be understood adequately without placing them in their historical contexts. For this reason, it's critical to connect key factors emerging from each country's historical trajectory, as demonstrated in the accounts provided above, relative to national identity. As established earlier, national identity development is seen as a critical component in nation building projects, as it sets up an ideal "we" to whom the nation belongs.

It follows that the institutional governance mechanisms created for the purpose of governing this imagined "we" reflect the needs, desires, and rights of this "we" that comprises the nation-state. In Panamá, the imagined national "we" was able to expand (if only slightly) in such a way as to acknowledge blackness as a political identity existing within its geographic and constitutional borders. In the Dominican Republic, blackness became extinct, relegated to an undesired characteristic reminiscent of former occupation by black people in the 19th century. Why this difference? What in the described historical trajectories above provide an explanation for this?

One key factor emerges, contributing significantly to the different approaches to national identity between the countries; the proximity of an independent black nation. Perhaps it seems counterintuitive that this should be the case, that it should be something radically different at play explaining each nation's approach to national identity vis-à-vis blackness. It's no coincidence that the

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Globalization, and Race Policy in Latin America." Pp. 13–32 in *New Social Movements in the African Diaspora : challenging global apartheid*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan (2009) for a cross-national perspective.

Dominican Republic reacted to the specter of continued Haitian aggression by creating an imagined Dominican identity that extinguished its connection to Haitian-ness by eliminating its recognition of African heritage and ancestry early in the nation-state formation stages.

Exacerbating this issue is a mountainous border between the two countries that continuous to remain porous, which for centuries has been used to smuggle contraband between the two halves of the island. Additionally, the significance of Haiti being the only free, black country in the western hemisphere in the early 20th century as a result of slave rebellion should not be lost. Across Latin America and the United States, the fear of another Haiti forming in the Americas was not a welcomed prospect, hence the newly formed Dominican nation-state's insistence to the United States that it was not a black country. The very proximity of Haiti to the Dominican Republic threatened to jeopardize the nascent nation's hopes for inclusion in the global, industrialized world. As a result, ruling elites and dictators both sought every advantage to promote their whiteness, if only to provide a stark contrast to the utterly black nation next door.

The fatalistic anxiety Dominicans demonstrated towards Haitians found its way into the national imagination, as was shown above, resulting in the construction of a Dominican national identity that owes its very formulation to this anxiety. The resulting differences can be traced back to each country's historical approach to its own national identity, which continue to influence state responses to contention. In Panamá, social movement actors benefit from a long and widespread history of contention and continue to advance a black identity agenda that has garnered some support and some positive responses from the Panamanian government. In the Dominican Republic, however, black identity-based movements active today face far different circumstances.

The Nature of Identity-Based Contention in the Two Countries

It can be said that black social movement claims in Panamá have remained largely ignored by various sectors of Panamanian society throughout the 20th and 21st Centuries, in particular by the government, and the mestizo middle-class general public.[34] At the same time, the movement has experienced some measure of success (as was mentioned above), overcoming some challenges along the way. From expanding suffrage for all black Panamanians in the early 20th Century and establishing a national museum of black Antillean history, to securing anti-discrimination laws, a state-sponsored national day of black heritage, and a national office focused on black issues, one can say that the Panamanian black movement has achieved some of the goals it has advocated for across decades. While these movements have not secured the substantive changes they seek, such as criminalization for racially discriminatory practices, investment in poor urban black neighborhoods and cities, and expanded economic, educational, and health opportunities, they continue to contest socio-political and cultural status quo.

Strategies and actions conducted by black social movement actors in Panamá is, and has been, black-identity driven, that is to say grounded in an unapologetic African heritage that openly connects both Antillean and Colonial black people to African ancestry. African-ness, its customs and traditions, is championed by black movement actors as a cultural inheritance that enriches the nation-state, and that should not be discriminated against or diminished in any way on the basis of black stigma.[35] Blackness, then for Panamanian black social movement actors, becomes an internally unrecognized political identity deserving of recognition and equitable political participation. Black social movement

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34 See Tapia (2009).
35 See Szok (2012) for an in-depth exploration of black-identity based cultural practices and symbolic contention.

actors use blackness as a political identity to challenge who belongs to the nation and to whom the nation belongs, articulating blackness as a difference in identity that requires adequate accommodation within the nation-building project, one that recognizes the inherent value in heterogeneity, much in the same manner that indigenous groups in Panamá have made the same claim along cultural lines.

Using well-established theoretical lenses of contentious politics, movement framing and cultural politics,[36] enables this research to locate social movement activities across history and across different actors. The Panamanian black social movement, for example, has various institutions (large and small) that play a role in movement activities at different times and in different ways. Sometimes these activities appear to be isolated, sometimes even contradictory, but what is common about them is that they are all united in a similar goal of improving social justice outcomes for people of African descent in Panamá.

For example, a black labor union's tactics may not align with black political inclusion claims pursued by political advocates, and allies may be weak in the anti-discrimination camp of black social movement actors when compared to the cultural inclusion camp of social movement actors. However, despite these observable differences, it would be a mistake to classify such disparities within any social movement as indicators of disparate, isolated collective actions that may or may not be part of a larger social movement with a coherent ideological center to which the different independent actors belong.[37] Regardless of the differences in tactic and strategy, or differences in goals, individual and group actors within the Panamanian black social movement share a unified sense of the struggle in which they

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36 See Tarrow (2011) for an explanation of contentious politics over time; Benford and Snow (2010) on how movements frame their claims, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) on how movements respond to political opportunities and threats, and Goodwin and Jasper (2004) on how the cultural landscape of a nation enables or limits social movement development.
37 Tarrow's (2011) theory of contentious politics is useful here in allowing for internal differences manifesting in social movements across actors and groups as part of a larger effort to maintain a common purpose and social solidarity.

participate, connecting themselves to the historical markers (such as those mentioned above) highlighting a national black Panamanian effort grounded in a national black consciousness.

Having a national black consciousness enables movement actors to expand contentious activities along several fronts, allowing Antillean and Colonial black Panamanians to see themselves as part of a larger "we" comprised of black people with African heritage who deserve a place within national identity. This black consciousness is inherently political, growing from a rich historical evolution of black identity formation in Panamá (dating back to the 16th century *cimarrones*) and expanding with the arrival of thousands of Antillean workers in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The identity-based Panamanian black social movement's development, viewed across the history of Panamá, can be perceived as a political act that unfolds within and alongside the context of a developing Panamanian national identity, maintaining an active cycle of contention through the years in an effort to eliminate all aspects of political inequities in Panamá based on the denial and exclusion of black bodies.[38]

Compared to Panamá, one can see that a similar process of black identity social movement formation across history did not take place in the Dominican Republic. The nation's ongoing anxieties about Haitians, and its unique ideological positioning vis-à-vis blackness, served to undermine any opportunity for contention based on the concept of black identity. However, despite this history of increasing nation-state exclusion of black people based on black identity in the Dominican Republic and limited opportunities to challenge these exclusions, black social movements do exist today.

For example: Dominican@s por Derecho is a coalition of organizations and individuals fighting anti-Haitian legislation; Movimiento Comunitario Politico Dominco-Haitiano (MCPDH)

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38 See Craft (2008) for exploration of the Panamanian black identity consciousness development.

formed as a political party in order to influence electoral politics by gathering votes to help advance their agenda of ending anti-Haitian legislation; the Movimiento por un Registro Civil Libre de Discriminación (known as Reconoci.do) is a national network of Haitian rights activists that seek full political inclusion of Dominicans of Haitian descent; and the Moviemiento de Mujeres Dominico-Haitiana (MUDHA), a non-governmental organization that works on pushing for inclusionary policies for women of Haitian descent and fights anti-Haitian legislation.

All of the associational groups, political parties, and non-profit organizations listed here that are involved in protest against the Dominican nation-state today do so on the basis of a Dominican born identity of Haitian descent. Their existence is relatively new, with the majority of them coming into existence only in the last twenty years (with the exception of MUDHA, which came into existence in the 1980s to support Haitian women in the *bateys*—sugar cane plantations). Combined, these groups form the bulk of the Dominican black identity movement, focusing on issues of statelessness and discrimination towards Dominicans of Haitian ancestry.

Unlike the history of movement contention evident in Panamá, which dates back decades, the Dominican black identity social movement has relatively little contentious history informing its current activities and practices. Allies for movement actors are weak or non-existent, and while there is support from transnational actors, namely from Dominicans abroad and the international human rights community, the black social movement in the Dominican republic has had little to no effect on Dominican policies and practices affecting black people.

Lacking a history of identity-based contention, black identity social movement actors in the Dominican Republic have not yet formulated the types of political identity strategies seen in Panamá, nor have any Dominican organizations formed around a Dominican black identity that is internal to,

conversant with, and consciousness raising of Dominican African heritage absent any articulation with Haiti. Instead, as can be noted from the movement actors highlighted above, black contention in the Dominican Republic re-articulates Dominican national-identity ideology by labeling its support of black Dominicans of Haitian descent. Their language self-describes their work to push for Dominican state inclusion of Dominicans born of Haitian parents and/or heritage.

Such a framing strategy further undermines these black social movement actors' abilities to succeed because it feeds into the unresolved, long-standing anxiety regarding Haitians that exists in Dominican consciousness as a result of an intentional effort to eliminate any linkage to blackness in the Dominican national identity project dating back to the 19th century. To be black is to be Haitian, and to be Haitian is to be anti-Dominican. Trujillo's anti-Haitianismo is alive and well in the 21st century, as evidenced in the last ten years of legislation stripping basic citizenship rights from Dominican born Haitians, which culminated in the September 23, 2013 resolution TC 169-14. Resolution TC 169-14 prevents any Dominican born Haitian from receiving Dominican citizenship and retroactively strips any Dominican born Haitian who has received his/her citizenship, dating back to 1929, if one of his/her parents is not of Dominican blood.[39] Black social movements have been in a two-year long battle now in their attempt to reverse this law, seeking support from the international community in particular, which has overwhelmingly condemned TC 169-14, but to no avail.

Any contention in the Dominican Republic based on blackness as a political identity ultimately meets with the state-cultivated ideology of *raza dominicana* and anti-Haitianismo, which today appears to be so inseparable from social and cultural norms that to challenge the Dominican state on

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39 See the Dominican@s por Derecho website (https://dominicanosxderecho.wordpress.com/) for a detailed timeline of anti-Haitian laws that began in 2004 to specifically target Haitians in immigration legislation.

the inclusion of blackness equates to challenging the Dominican population to accept its African heritage. Whether or not the general Dominican population is ready to accept that its celebrated mixed heritage is significantly African and not indigenous (as is the claim of *raza dominicana*) remains to be seen.

It is likely that any potential future success (outside of securing economic sanctions from other nations, which so far doesn't appear to be in the horizon) to be achieved by black social movement actors will require similar framing strategies akin to those found in Panamá, in which pride in African heritage and connectivity to the African Diaspora movement gave rise to slow nation-state accommodation of blackness in the Panamanian national identity project. Black social movement actors in the Dominican Republic would have to engage in a war of ideology in order to first undo the legacy of anti-Haitianismo that permeates all elements of Dominican life, and in doing so first address the need to extricate being black from that idea that it also means being Haitian. If such an ideological shift were to be accomplished, the possibility for general support from the Dominican population for black identity movement claims could potentially grow, as the Dominican Republic is, after all, a nation with a large percentage of people who have African heritage (a fact not admitted by the state or the general population, as a matter of course, to this day, due to the *raza dominicana* ideology).

Recommendations for Further Research

Conclusion

Considered from a political process theoretical approach, such as political opportunities structure, the lack of social movement outcomes in the Dominican Republic could be seen simply as a direct result of closed opportunities for Haitian-Dominican influence, which becomes confused with

Haitian-Dominican diplomatic and economic relations. Lacking political allies, political influence, or popular support would seem to indicate limited opportunities for successful contentious action by black Dominican movement actors.

But such an analysis would miss a significant number of important factors playing a role in current-day events in the Dominican Republic. The same approach, when used to evaluate Panamanian outcomes, would seem to indicate that political will, a more consistent commitment to democratic values, and significant allies (such as the Catholic Church and indigenous groups) combined to offer expanding opportunities to contest for greater inclusion of black people in the Panamanian nation-building project. Similarly, a cultural politics approach would provide a partial explanation of the observed outcomes differences between the two countries via an exploration of the cultural values and motifs used by Panamanian and Dominican black social movements. While useful and informative (and certainly utilized here), both approaches (structural and cultural) need to be combined with additional perspectives in order to have a better understanding of the environment in which social movement actors engage, including the historical factors that contributed to the particular differences inherent to each nation-state's ideological and institutional development along social, economic, cultural, and political lines.

In considering black identity social movement contention in Latin America, there is insufficient attention paid to the potentially significant political shifts these movements attempt to achieve. This brief analysis of the two different national environments in which black identity social movements actively engage in contentious activities begins to scratch the figurative surface of the possibility to expand our understanding of the mediating factors that influence political outcomes. In the case of Panamá and the Dominican Republic, this analysis shows that the concept of blackness plays a

significant mediating role vis-à-vis national identity, the nation-building project, and social movement contention possibilities and outcomes.

Based on this analysis, it is possible to say, then, that in terms of outcomes theory, black identity-based social movement contention is likely to achieve more socio-political desired outcomes (relatively speaking) in a nation-state that recognizes blackness as a political identity than similar black contention in a nation-state that does not recognize blackness as a political identity. Establishing what constitutes nation-state political identity recognition of blackness requires incorporation of a historical comparative perspective, which provides additional information about slowly developing social, cultural, political factors in a given nation over the course of its history.

(Need to discuss potential research opportunities and discuss again what this paper was able to highlight and show)