Georgina Gardiner

Georgi Gardiner is an Associate Professor of Philosophy and GESS (Gender and Sexuality Studies) at Tulane University. Before that, she was faculty at the University of Tennessee, and held fellowships at Oxford University, the Denbo Center for the Humanities, and the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS).

She specialises in epistemology, social philosophy, meta-philosophy. This includes research in evidence law, legal proof, rape accusations, self-deception, virtue epistemology, epistemic value, and the ethics of belief.

She also works on the philosophy of attention, sexuality, love, relationships, circus, risk, and the occult. She is fascinated by how people gather and how innovative gatherings can help individuals flourish.

Selected Publications

‘Sex Witchcraft: Sex is So Great it Can Improve the Rest of Your Life’, (forthcoming) The Philosophy of Sexual Violence ed. Georgi Gardiner and Micol Bez. Routledge.

‘Naturalistic Function-First Epistemology’ (forthcoming) Kornblith and His Critics, eds. Joshua DiPaolo and Luis Oliveira. Oxford University Press.

‘Legal Evidence and Knowledge’, (2023) The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence, eds. Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Clayton Littlejohn. Routledge.

‘We Forge the Conditions of Love’, (2023) Linguistic Luck: Safeguards and Threats to Linguistic Communication eds. Carlos Montemayor & Abrol Fairweather, OUP, 279–314.

‘Corroboration’, (2023) American Philosophical Quarterly 60(2): 131–148.

‘Attunement: On the Cognitive Virtues of Attention’, (2022) Social Virtue Epistemology, eds. Mark Alfano, Colin Klein, and Jeroen de Ridder. Routledge, 48–72.

‘The Safe, the Sensitive, and the Severely Tested: A Unified Account’, (2022) Synthese 200(5): 1–33, with mathematician Brian Zaharatos.

‘Opacity of Character: Virtue Ethics and the Legal Admissibility of Character Evidence’, (2021) Philosophical Issues 31(1): 334–354, with Jacob Smith.

‘Banal Skepticism and the Errors of Doubt: On Ephecticism about Rape Accusations’, (2021) Midwest Studies in Philosophy 45: 393–421.

‘Relevance and Risk: Relevant Alternatives and the Epistemology of Risk’, (2021) Synthese 199: 481–511. 

‘Profiling and Proof: Are Statistics Safe?’, (2020) Philosophy 95(2): 1–22.

‘The Reasonable and the Relevant: Legal Standards of Proof’, (2019) Philosophy & Public Affairs 47(3): 288–318.

‘Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment’, (2018) Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism, ed. Kevin McCain. Springer, 169–95.