Sperisen's research is in microeconomic theory and game theory, in particular repeated games and reputation. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Texas at Austin in 2015. His work primarily studies games with incomplete information (reputation) where players do not observe all of the past history. He is interested in analyzing such games with bounded memory, meaning information is forgotten after a certain period of time. Examples include credit histories (where negative information like bankruptcy is forgotten by law after some number of years) and many online markets.
His work is in developing recursive methods for computing the set of equilibrium payoffs in these types of games. He is also interested in modeling drug wars in a repeated games context, examining how government crackdowns may lead to less cooperation between drug cartels and thus an increase in violence, as seen during the Mexican government's anti-cartel offensive beginning in 2006.
Research interests: microeconomic theory and game theory; repeated games and reputation