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Stefano Barbieri
Associate Professor
504-862-8358
309B Tilton Hall

Education

Ph.D., Economics (2004), University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA
B.S., Economics (1998), summa cum laude, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy

Biography

Stefano Barbieri is Associate Professor of Economics at Tulane University. He received his Ph.D. in economics from the University of Pennsylvania in 2004. Before moving to the United States from Italy, Dr. Barbieri received his B.S. in economics from Bocconi University in Milan in 1998. Dr. Barbieri is interested in cooperation broadly defined. Examples of applications of his research include the behavioral basis of the decision to join a citizens’ group, the analysis of efficiency and profitability of various fundraising mechanisms, the effects of complementarity of efforts within teams and on the competition across teams, and the analysis of how a focus on poverty and inequality shapes the political economy incentives to cooperate within governments.

Stefano Barbieri is co-editor of Economic Inquiry and Associate Editor of the Journal of Public Economic Theory. His research has been published in journals such as the Journal of Public Economics, Games and Economic Behavior, Economic Theory, and the Journal of Public Economic Theory.

Interests

Research interests: public economics, economic theory, fundraising, contests

Contributions

Publications

  • On the Voluntary Provision of “Weakest-Link” Public Goods: the case of private information. (with D. Malueg).Journal of Public Economic Theory accepted [pdf].
  • Middle-Class Flight from Post-Katrina New Orleans: A Theoretical Analysis of Inequality and Schooling. (with J. Edwards). Regional Science and Urban Economics 64, 12-29 (2017). [link]
  • Voluntary Provision of Public Goods with Private Information Using Order Statistics. Economics Letters 150, 63-66 (2017) [link]
  • Private Information in the BBV Model of Public Goods (with D. Malueg). Journal of Public Economic Theory18, 851-881 (2016) [pdf].
  • Private-Information Group Contests:Best-Shot Competition (with D. Malueg). Games and Economic Behavior98, 219-234 (2016). [link].
  • The Best-Shot (Group) All-Pay Auction with Complete Information (with D. Malueg and I. Topolyan).Economic Theory 57: 603-640 (2014). [link].
  • Group Efforts when Performance Is Determined by the "Best Shot". (with D. Malueg). Economic Theory 56: 333-373 (2014). [link].
  • Increasing Fundraising Success by Decreasing Donors' Choice. (with D. Malueg). Journal of Public Economic Theory 16: 372-400 (2014). [link].
  • Communication and Early Contributions. Journal of Public Economic Theory 14: 391-421 (2012). [link].
  • Threshold Uncertainty in the Private-Information Subscription Game. (with D. Malueg). Journal of Public Economics 94: 848-861 (2010). [link].
  • Profit-Maximizing Sale of a Discrete Public Good via the Subscription Game in Private-Information Environments. (with D. Malueg). The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics: Vol. 10: Iss. 1 (Contributions), Article 5 (2010). [link].
  • Membership in Citizen Groups. (with A. Mattozzi). Games and Economic Behavior 67: 217-232 (2009). [link].
  • Private Provision of a Discrete Public Good: Efficient Equilibria in the Private-Information Contribution Game. (with D. Malueg). Economic Theory 37(1): 51-80 (2008). [link].
  • Private Provision of a Discrete Public Good: Continuous-Strategy Equilibria in the Private-Information Subscription Game. (with D. Malueg). Journal of Public Economic Theory 10: 529-545 (2008). [link].

Working Papers

  • Towards an Understanding of the Political Economy of Multidimensional Poverty Measurement (with S. Higgins).